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1    Introduction 
The scope and complexity of the global Internet infrastructure show that no single actor can manage 
cyberspace on its own. Cyberspace requires a pluralistic approach to policing where different actors are 
involved in the process of monitoring, detecting, and investigating online crime in virtual spaces. The 
overarching challenges for policing derive from the fact that the virtual world is extra-territorial without 
fixed boundaries applying to legal or illegal online activities in the same way as the rules and regulations 
developed to manage real-time crimes. Cyberspace offers creative hackers the opportunity and freedom to 
obtain control over interconnected spaces
1
 
Responding and managing the growing number of cybercrimes requires another approach compared with 
offline crimes. Yet, the ambition is to enhance the different security actors’ role online on both the strategic 
and the practical level. The complexity of cyberspace calls for new techniques to be introduced which are not 
applicable to traditional crimes in the same format. Currently, there is an international legislative gap that 
needs to be assessed in order to create a better preventive and investigative consensus worldwide. 
The online challenges as well as the rise of the Darknet have created severe obstacles to traditional police 
investigation and it is no longer possible to trace cyber offenders by their online footprints. To be effective, 
law enforcement has been called upon to actively monitor and secretly infiltrate virtual spaces such as the 
Darknet and different social media forums. Moreover, the growing use of encryption of data makes it 
difficult to obtain access to the material during an investigation. Private actors are also increasingly involved 
in the monitoring and investigatory processes, and mega Internet businesses and Internet service providers 
are enhancing their monitoring systems.
2
 New initiatives were launched in the aftermath of the 2017 terrorist 
attacks in the United Kingdom (UK), where the focus has been on the role of large Internet companies and 
their responsibility to monitor illegal activities online.
3
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Policing virtual spaces with several public and private actors is compatible with the restructuring of police 
forces in recent years where traditional police work increasingly merge with private security actors ( see 
Egan infra).
4
 The interaction between public policing and private security presents new challenges as the 
different actors from the private and public sector have different agendas and methods to monitor the 
Internet, which means that there are different questions regarding ethical, moral and legal questions, for 
instance in relation to police investigation methods.    
This chapter investigates and explains the online legislative framework and policing practices developed to 
manage virtual spaces. This is an under-researched area, and data regarding law enforcement operations is 
limited. However, there is ample supply of research that has been published on legal issues concerning the 
policing of online child sex offenders. Economic cybercrime is also an area where a number of empirical 
research projects have analysed the bitcoin industry and the online purchases of drugs in the aftermath of 
demolition of the online illegal marketspace, the ’Silk Road’.
5
 Therefore, this chapter will draw on the 
relevant findings which assist in reconstructing the emergence of a complex policing framework. First, this 
chapter sets out the framework for the ensuing discussion by defining crucial areas such as virtual spaces, 
cybercrime, the Darknet and cybercrime legislation. Second, this chapter focuses on and transnational and 
cross-sectoral legislative problems which creates limitations to policing. Thirdly, this chapter will include 
different private and public policing challenges as well as outline some of the complications of online public 
and private policing, such as technological regulation and operational limitations. 
 
2    Defining Virtual Spaces and Cybercrime  
Cyberspace is defined by its global interconnectivity. It is defined as "the notional environment in which 
communication over computer networks occurs".
6
 Cyberspace can be explained as ‘as the diverse 
experiences of space associated with computing and related technologies'.
7
 Deibert and Rohozinski have 
supported this definition by claiming that cyberspace includes both a material and a virtual realm of things 
and ideas, structure and content.
8
 Virtual spaces consist of several elements, and they are based on physical 
infrastructures and telecommunications devices (SCADA devices, smartphones/tablets, computers, servers, 
                                                          
4
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etc.); connected networks systems and organisational networks of networks systems; the access nodes of 
users and intermediaries routing nodes and essential data.
9
 
Virtual spaces are associated with positive as well as negative values, for instance with freedom, but also 
with a threat. Virtual spaces can be interpreted in a broad sense as they concern computer technologies, 
communication platforms and specific areas, which can be attacked. For example, cybercrime can be 
something that threatens the personal integrity of individual's online activities. Other areas are transferred 
from offline offences to cyberspace, such as fraud, theft, threats, manipulations, bullying and 
discrimination.
10
 These are part of the contemporary world along with child pornography, voyeurism and 
xenophobia. Moreover, cyberspace can be used as a platform for freedom and of political activism, where the 
online platforms open up to new forms of political participation and organisation of democracy.
11
 
The Internet, the Darknet and other non-traceable networks and forums creates a significant challenge to 
policing. Law enforcement actors are forced to develop and introduce very intrusive ways of policing based 
on surveillance, covert operations where police officers interact with cybercriminals in an unprecedented 
form. Yet, this does not signify that law enforcement should be allowed to intervene indiscriminately in 
people’s online and offline lives. There are limits to police powers offline which also should apply to online 
policing, such as use the existing warrant routes to access online user’s data. However, there are also various 
exceptions to these normative standards. Police investigators are generally allowed to access to chat rooms, 
to monitor conversations and pose as potential victims and sexual offenders online to identify predators as 
well as sellers or buyers on illegal markets.
12
 Law enforcement agencies are also using the same tools to 
infiltrate the Darknet to follow illegal activities, and prosecute terrorists and organised online criminals. The 
Snowdon revelations in 2013 showed that state agencies have extended their powers to monitor online users, 
crack encryption codes and build backdoors into software.
13
 Allowing law enforcement to circumvent 
encryption and build backdoors into systems was raised again after the San Bernardino attack in 2016, where 
the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) wanted Apple to break the encryption code on an iPhone. 
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These hidden networks, forums, and communication platforms are based on attribution, anonymization and 
encryption. Facilitated by a combination of the Internet and encryption technologies, the Darknet trade is 
possible and will increase in the future as it will continue to create difficulties for law enforcement to break 
the encryption codes.
15
 Together with new computer technologies and virtual spaces, the secret underworld 
makes policing difficult because law enforcement’s limited powers to follow criminal leads online. 
Currently, a number of new legal instruments in the field of cybercrime are being drafted to address the 
changes in online criminal behaviour. For example, The Netherlands has been active in adopting new 
legislation and is progressing its adoption of the Third Computer Crime Legislation.
16
 The legislation was 
passed in Parliament but was awaiting endorsement by the Senate at the time of writing. This cybercrime 
legislation allows police officers to actively infiltrate computer data of individuals who are suspected of 
specified crimes as well as crimes that may undermine the legal order (i.e. terrorism). Moreover, in this 3
rd
 
generation legislation, a new article has been added which gives police the power to prevent the crime, 
allowing the Public Prosecutor the possibility to make the relative content inaccessible in order to end or 
prevent new criminal offences.
17
 This also means that the Netherlands is in the second phase of 
implementing the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
However, the actual challenge of policing the Internet is not only linked to the increasing use of the Darknet, 
the TOR network, proxy servers, secure hosting and encrypted communication apps. There is a range of 
products and services that cover user’s activities, and identities are readily available online. In the mind of 
law enforcement communities these create obstacles for the effective policing of online criminal activity.
18
 
Europol has highlighted that communities of offenders mature and learn from their own mistakes as well as 
their assets that have been seized by law enforcement. Thus, it becomes very difficult to infiltrate 
cyberspace, and the increase of online policing has pushed offenders to switch to the untraceable dark-
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 Many criminal tools and services cut across several different cybercrime areas. 
Disrupting one network has a significant impact on a larger number of cyber-enabled crime due to the 
interconnectivity. To disrupt, dismantle or take down these networks, a greater level of cooperation is 
required between investigators from, for example, cyber-attacks, payment fraud and online child sexual 
extortion units to efficiently prioritise and coordinate investigations and prevent conflicts of interest between 
the different units.
20
 The fact is that cybercrime units need to work across the narrowly defined cyber-crime 
types and spread knowledge and techniques about cybercriminal's methods and profile. Together, policing 
units are forced to develop norms and practices which can cover more than one cybercrime area. This 
cooperation involves developing useful operational methods to infiltrate and investigate the hidden networks 
and forums, where cyber criminals can manoeuvre undetectably. Currently, there is a lack of a unified 
legislative framework that ties together public and private policing means and methods at national as well as 
international level. 
2.1    Policing virtual spaces: a public and private challenge 
The policing of virtual spaces tends to have a highly proactive character. Several measures have been 
introduced to monitor and prevent cybercrime. Policing today is practiced as a pluralistic enterprise where 
public and private security actors co-operate and secure the Internet. A variety of surveillance techniques and 
monitoring software has been developed which influence policing of virtual spaces spanning from law 
enforcement investigation tools to Internet providers and social media use of monitoring, filtering and 
blocking software.
21
 The terrorist attacks in France and the UK has put a substantive pressure on Internet 
companies such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube to increase their private policing of extremist content 
uploaded on their platforms).
22
 Facebook (2017) claims that it has increased its specialist team working on 
counter-terrorism specifically. This includes academic experts on counterterrorism, former prosecutors, 
former law enforcement agents and analysts, and engineers. In addition, Facebook highlights that it applies 
algorithms to identify groups of accounts, messages or images.
23
 This illustrates that the role of private actors 
in the policing of virtual spaces is rapidly on the rise. Activities such as filtering, blocking and intrusive 
undercover policing operations have transformed from the original idea concept of cyberspace being a 
cyberspace for communication to a monitored and regulated space. Surveillance techniques and tools are 
                                                          
19
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20
 Europol 2016a (see note 18), 15. 
21
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widely used and the use of undercover police operations have spread from the United States to the European 
mainland – yet with some national limitations.
24
  
The focus on terrorists’ use of the Internet has increased the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015.
25
 The European 
attacks are indirectly linked to online spaces as the attackers draw inspiration from each other and 
propaganda and extremists’ material are widely broadcasted and streamed online.
26
 In 2010, the UK 
introduced the Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU), which is a national police unit that works 
together with online companies to address the growing number of online content that violate legal 
prohibitions against glorifying or inciting acts of terrorism.
27
 In 2015, the European Union created a similar 
Internet Referral Unit
28
 and France adopted legislation that expanded the government's surveillance 
authorities to counter terrorist threats.
29
 
The EU has launched different initiatives and forums to tackle online radicalism. The Radicalisation 
Awareness Network (RAN) was established in 2011.
30
 In 2015, the EU established an Internet Forum which 
brings together the online industry, Member States, law enforcement and civil society partners to discuss 
how to manage the growing challenge of online extremist propaganda and create a voluntary cooperation, 
which at the same time protects fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression. The Commission has 
worked together with social media businesses, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Microsoft, to 
establish a code of conduct to combat the spread of illegal hate speech online in Europe.
31
 
One of the most significant challenges to managing virtual spaces is the jurisdictional dilemma where cyber 
legislation is defined differently in jurisdictions worldwide. Legislation differs considerably in the various 
geographical jurisdictions and an act can be legal in one state but illegal in another.
32
 Unfortunately, the 
harmonisation or development of cybercrime legislation is hindered by a range of obstacles. Given the 
technological, legal and cultural diversity of the world’s nations, the risk perception differs strongly. States 
have different priorities; some recognise that different forms of regulation are needed to cover the extensive 
cybercrime types – and therefore, they have developed a comprehensive framework. There are states who do 
                                                          
24
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not recognise cyber-offences and regard them as falling under the scope of existing offline regulations and 
thereby, they are rejecting the whole framework of cyber-dependent crimes. Moreover, some states are 
focusing on online theft of intellectual property where other states are prioritising online blasphemous or 
seditious communications.
33
 A different interpretation of acceptable online behaviour puts strains on policing 
and the way they are deployed to the online community.
34
  
Cybercrimes are by nature transnational but because of the lack of comprehensive international treaties and 
cooperation, the effort to manage cybercrime is largely left in the hands of national law enforcement. So far, 
obstacles for ensuring efficient management derive from judiciary limits, insufficient intelligence 
gathering/sharing capabilities, technical difficulties, disparate investigative and forensic capacities, lack of 
trained staff, and inconsistent cooperation with other stakeholders.
35
 
3 Characteristics of Cybercrime 
It is widely recognised that cybercrime has two overall characteristics. Cyberspace opens up new ways of 
committing a crime, or new ways of committing offline crimes. This forces governments around the world to 
introduce new laws to respond to the new threats.
36
 Europol (2016) has highlighted a new platform for crime 
based on an increasing cybercriminal economy based on the inclusion of cyberspace in everyday life and the 
low level of digital security. These cybercrimes mirror traditional crimes (cyber-enabled crime) where cyber-
space is a mean to an end; they are only different in their practice.
37
 These traditional crime types have 
emerged in forums where criminals and potential criminals exploit cyberspace to commit crime, i.e. online 
paedophilia, cyber terrorism, identity theft, online fraud, ransomware, the criminal use of data, payment 
fraud, online child sexual abuse, abuse of the Darknet, social engineering and virtual currencies.
38
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97(2) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 601, 602; Jackson 2017 (note 36 above); Theoharis 2016 (note 36 
above); Europol 2016a (note 18 above); Europol 2016b (note 18 above); M McGuire and S Dowling, ‘Cyber crime: A 
review of the evidence. Chapter 1: Cyber-dependent crimes’ (Home Office, October 2013b). 
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Other cybercrimes (cyber-dependent crimes) are specific related to cyberspace using computer technology to 
develop new forms of crime, i.e. malware infections, viruses, spam, denial of service attacks.
39
 These types 
of cybercrime are based on the technological development and the online interconnectivity, and they can 
only be carried out using cyber-space. Therefore, these cyber-dependent crimes are distinct from real-time 
offences even though they share some parameters with real-time crimes.
40
 
Today, online and offline criminal activities are entangled due to the rapid technological development which 
puts pressure on policing in a non-physical domain which has merged with the real world on multiple 
levels.
41
 Cyber-dependent crimes are harder to deal with because there is no offline crime legislation which 
can be used analogue until cyber legislation is developed. Yet, it is not only in relation to cyber-dependent 
crimes that a legislation framework is underdeveloped. In other areas, such as cyber-terrorism, specific 
legislation has not been developed and it has not been considered to be a distinct offence. Instead, cyber-
terrorism is considered to be covered by the counter-terrorism legislation and/ or cybercrime, depending on 
the offence. However, the growing use of the Internet to recruit and spread propaganda by IS and large-scale 
attacks, such as the Dyn
42
 attack in 2016 calls for a rethinking of cyber-terrorism as a cybercrime type 
separated from offline crime rather than keep the offences floating between counter-terrorism and 
cybercrime legislation. 
A classic example of transnational cybercrime is the ‘love bug' worm from 2000. This worm was developed 
in the Philippines and infected computers worldwide. Yet, the investigation in the Philippines was hindered 
because of malicious development and spreading of damaging software, at the time, was not criminalised in 
the country.
43
 This bug was a global eye-opener which instigated the development of cybercrime legislations. 
Yet, the problem of international cybercrime stays unsolved. Some interesting cases have caught the world 
by surprise, such as the suspicion about Russian spyware during the United States of America (USA) 
Presidential election in 2016, where Russian hackers made repeated attempts before the election to get into 
important US institutions.
44
 Moreover, it has been claimed that Russian hackers tried to hijack the US 
election by targeting the election systems in 21 US states.
45
 In 2017, large scale attacks have increased which 
have had a significant impact worldwide. The WannaCry Ransomware attack worldwide showed the 
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problems with the online interconnectivity and the problems investigating the attack – especially as it is 
presumed that the hackers belonged to the Lazarus Group; a group that works from both China and North-
Korea.
46
 Later in 2017, another international ransomware attack, PetrWrap, brought down banks, 





4    The Criminalisation of Online Conduct in National Jurisdictions 
States worldwide have developed legislation which criminalises cybercrimes and different online behaviours. 
The punishments might increase the level and the severity of sentences. However, they have limited effect on 
making virtual spaces safer, and it is difficult to get a precise overview over the conviction rates as most 
cybercrime data are not separated from offline offences. For example, in the UK, data about the conviction 
rate of online grooming and online sexual child abuse was not divided between online and offline offences 
and only a small number of offences falls under the scope of the UK Computer Misuse Act 1990.
48
 Harsh 
punishment might dissuade some people, but the cybercriminals with the intent to misuse computer systems 
are likely to continue their criminal pathway online and they are seldom caught and prosecuted.
49
 
Cybercriminals can easily move their enterprise to safe havens that have little or no cybercrime legislation in 
place. Moreover, the online underground represented by the Darknet and the extended use of encryption 
create a unique opportunity to continue to offend and be inspired by other cybercriminals. This requires that 
law enforcement directs their efforts to these networks and they need to adjust the practices to the new 
circumstances in this untraceable area.  
4.1 Legal Frameworks on Cybercrime 
One of the problems related to the online policing is the lack of a standard definition which can be used 
universally. The definitions as well as legislation developed is fragmented and content-related rather than 
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providing general guidelines and powers that can be transferred to the different crime forms. At the Tenth 
United Nation Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (2000) cybercrime was 
defined as “cybercrime in a narrow sense (computer crime): Any illegal behaviour directed at employing 
electronic operations that targets the security of computer systems and the data processed by them”.
50
 
Moreover, the definition also covers the second strand by including: “Cybercrime in a broader sense 
(computer-related crime): Any illegal behaviour committed by means of, or in relation to, a computer system 
or network, including such crimes as illegal possession [and] offering or distributing information by means 
of a computer system or network”.
51
  
Currently, there is only one global cybercrime convention developed in place. The Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Cybercrime from 2001 opens for a global framework.
52
 This Convention establishes a more 
harmonised approach to policing by offering definitions and criminalisation of certain online behaviours.
53
 
Additionally, the Convention is wide-ranging, and it includes illegal access, illegal interception of data, data 
interference, system interference, misuse of devices, computer-related forgery, computer-related fraud, 
offences related to child pornography and online offences related to infringements of copyright and related 
rights.
54
 The Convention also provides a common-law enforcement framework for dealing with cyber 
criminals, foster sharing of information among all signatory states, and it gives powers to security actors. 
Significantly, the Convention allows for intrusive monitoring systems for offline collection of online data.
55
  
Nevertheless, only a limited number of states have signed up to this convention which leaves the area 
significantly unregulated in a global context.
56
 One the most severe limitations to tackle the global 
phenomenon of cybercrime is the lack of signature states – which weakens the global effect of the 
Convention.
57
 By 2017, only 55 states signed up for the Convention, and only 51 states ratified it (Colombia, 
Ghana, Paraguay, and Peru have not ratified the Convention). Surprisingly, four-member states of the 
Council of Europe have not signed up for this treaty (Ireland, Russia, San Marino and Sweden).
58
 For 
example, Sweden needs a constitutional change in order to ratify the Convention and its additional 
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 This is the same problem Ireland is facing. However, the Department of Justice in Ireland 
published in 2016 the Criminal Justice (Offences Relating to Information Systems) Bill which makes it 
possible to ratify the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime.
60
 However, Russia chose not to sign 
the treaty due to cultural and political objections to international treaties, cybercrime investigative 
cooperation and the definition of cybercrime.
61
 Yet, this is a state-centric convention based on an agreement 
between states without any input from other actors, and non-state actors will still have very little influence on 
a new Convention, should it be negotiated. Moreover, due to the growing state concern of online activities 
and scepticism of private actors’ ability to monitoring online spaces, the outcome could change the multi-
stakeholder format of the Internet to a purely state-centric regulatory model.
62
 
Meanwhile, the European Commission (2007) proposed a three-fold definition which covers traditional 
forms of crime committed by means of electronic communication networks and information systems, 
publication of illegal content over electronic media and crimes unique to electronic networks.
63
 Other 
organisations include specific offences: The Council of Europe Convention (2001) uses the term cybercrime 
to refer to offences ranging from criminal activity against data to content and copyright infringement.
64
 The 
United Nations Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer-Related Crime (1994) definition includes 
fraud, forgery, computer sabotage, unauthorised access, and copying computer programmes as examples of 
cybercrime. However, neither most national legislations appear concerned with a strict definition of the word 
cybercrime. Instead, legislation is commonly referred to ‘computer crimes’, ‘electronic communications’, 
‘information technologies’ or ‘high-tech crime’.
65
 Surprisingly, nor does the Council of Europe Convention 
on Cybercrime (2001) offer a precise definition of cybercrime.
66
 The lack of an internationally recognised 
definition creates a definitional lacuna which creates obstacles for legislators and law enforcement and others 
involved in policing. However, most states accept that cybercrime is related to illegal online activities or 
behaviour, unauthorised access to a computer system or interference with a computer system or data. 
Moreover, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 from 2017 claims that in the pre-cyber era international law has been 
applied to cyber operations, both conducted by and directed against states.
67
 In relation to interstate online 
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conflicts, cyber events do not occur in a legal vacuum as states both have rights and obligations under 
international law.
68
                                           
Fragmented attempts and agreements are developed to manage the area, but it is challenging to ensure 
transnational commitment from states as well as cross-sectoral parties. The United Nations (UN) Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime covers some areas of cybercrime in relation to organised crime 
groups – but it does not cover the activities of individual hackers.
69
 In 2007, the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) launched the Global Cybercrime Agenda (GCA) for a framework to 
coordinate the international response to the growing cybersecurity challenge built on five pillars: Legal 
measures, technical and procedural measures, organisational structures, capacity building and international 
cooperation.
70
 There are several reasons for the lack of commitment to an international agreement. For 
instance, Russia and China have blocked UN attempts of creating an international cybercrime treaty. In 
2010, the issue was discussed but ended in a stalemate because Russia, China and a number of developing 
countries failed to reach an agreement with the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and the EU over 
national sovereignty issues and concerns for human rights.
71
 
There is a lack of consensus about the development and harmonisation of legislation and policing practices. 
Some countries do not acknowledge the scale of the problem and they are still under the impression that 
offline legislation covers online offences sufficiently. Other countries have a different interpretation of 
cyber-risks and the level of the problem. This differentiated focus on cybercrime blocks legislative consensus 
and it creates significant obstacles to developing governance and policing forms. These problems are not 
only related to transnational cooperation on the strategic level; the same barriers are visible on the 
operational level. For instance, Russia refused to cooperate with foreign law enforcement in the Estonia-case 
(2007) to investigate the cyber-attack.
72





4.2 Harmonisation of Cybercrime Legislation 
 The existence of fragmentary and divergent legislation may contribute to an unbalanced approach towards 
online security. For example, negotiations between Russia and Western partners on cyberspace issues are not 
progressing due to a lack of mutual comprehension and flexibility. National jurisdictions have different 
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norms and values which are seen as threatening to the other part. Moreover, there is a lack of collective 
understanding of cyberthreats as well as defined concepts which stall the development
74
 Even though China 
and Russia vetoed UN agreements, Russia presented in 2011 a “Draft Convention on International 
Information Security” which pre-dated the “International Code of Conduct for Information Security” annex 
presented by Russia and China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the UN 
Secretary-General in 2015.
75
 China and Russia signed a bilateral agreement in 2015, in which they agreed 
not to hack each other, as well as on law enforcement cooperation and exchange of cybersecurity 
technologies.
76
 Nevertheless, these countries’ positions are not clear in relation to cybercrime and the 
stakeholders involved. i.e. law enforcement cooperation and exchange of cybersecurity technologies. But the 
Code of Conduct and the Bilateral agreement do not specify if these laws apply to cyber space.
77
 China’s 
International Strategy of Cooperation in Cyberspace from 2016 includes a commitment to ‘study the 
application on international law in cyberspace. This should be done from the perspective of maintaining 
international security, mutual trust and preventing cyber-conflicts.
78
 There is a will to develop an agreement, 
but the UN parties and the Russian-China group have opposite views of the threat and what an agreement 
should contain.  
Policing online crimes reveals a legislative gap where states have different legislation in place which creates 
structural and cultural limitations upon legislations and this has resulted in an online security deficit.
79
 Online 
offending is significantly technical and legally complex. Continuous development in the functionality of 
information communication technologies (ICTs) and disparities between legal systems worldwide present a 
growing challenge to everyone involved in policing virtual spaces, such as first responders, investigatory 
authorities, forensic interrogators, prosecution services and criminal justice authorities.
80
 
The UN (2017) has provided an overview over the cybercrime legislation worldwide. The UN states that 138 
states have enacted cybercrime legislation. Of these, 95 states are developing and transition economies. Yet, 
30 countries still have no cybercrime legislation in place. The data provided by the UN shows that 72% of 
the states have legislation in place. 9% of the states have developed draft legislation, 19% of the states have 
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It is widely recognised that the compatibility of criminal offences and investigative measures across 
jurisdictions is the most efficient way to policing cyberspace and this goes through enhanced cooperation 
across jurisdictions. Different international organisations, such as the UN, the Internet Governance Forum, 
the Council of Europe and the EU have taken steps to manage cybercrime and develop a general cyber-
security framework to address the constant changing cyber-threats.
82
 However, the lack of recognition and 
harmonisation of legislation and practices can cause problems where cybercrime is carried out from states 
with more accommodating governance standards. This creates safe havens with opportunities to 
cybercriminals to avoid detection, prosecution and imprisonment.
83
 
The need for cross-jurisdictional harmonisation has been acknowledged in the European Union. Most EU 
Member States have expanded their national criminal code to include cybercrime because of the CoE 
Convention and the number of EU directives developed. Moreover, new EU legislation refers to 
criminalisation and penalties. The Treaty of Lisbon provided the European Union with a stronger mandate to 
harmonise legislation on computer-related crime.
84
 For example, the EU Directive 2011/92/EU on combating 
the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography
85
 includes 20 different offences, 
creates minimum levels for criminal penalties and facilitates reporting, investigation and prosecution.
86
 The 
EU Directive (2011) provides intrusive powers to law enforcement to prevent and prosecute offenders 
online, i.e. interception of communications, covert surveillance including electronic surveillance, monitoring 
of bank accounts or other financial investigations. The Directive states that tools should also include the 
possibility for law enforcement authorities to use a concealed identity on the Internet. Yet, these powers 
ought to be developed in accordance with national law.
87
 The problem is that there is no clear cybercrime 
legislation in place in most of these areas. Tackling cybercrime is implicit in legal EU instruments, such as 
the EU Directive on Money Laundering.
88
 Moreover, there is a legislative lacuna in relation to cyber-
terrorism which is caught up between national counter-terrorism and cybercrime legislation without 
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addressing the growing problem of encryption tools, the Darknet, broadcasting and streaming of extremist 
propaganda, as seen in relation to Telegram and WhatsApp communication apps.
89
  
The lack of consensus between transnational and cross-sectoral legislation and practices complicates the 
policing of virtual spaces. Moreover, the lack of transparency and openness regarding the strategies and 
measures imposed worldwide creates a problem regarding the problems and different measures and 
operations are often only discussed in the Western countries. Therefore, it is only possible to investigate the 
issue from a European-American public-private perspective.  
5   Plural Investigation and Monitoring of Virtual Spaces  
The evidence of cybercrime is mostly in electronic or digital form, such as computer files, transmissions, 
logs, metadata, or network data. Obtaining online evidence combines traditional and new policing 
techniques. Traditional policing techniques covers interviewing victims or undercover visual surveillance of 
suspects. New policing techniques covers computer-specific measures, such as viewing, and seizing or 




Technical measures and monitoring techniques is now a part of a wider surveillance regime where new 
processes, practices and software has been developed to police cyberspace. Surveillance introduced to 
monitor Internet traffic is now a common technique which normalises, or legitimises, Internet control. 
Surveillance has been defined as “any collection and processing personal data, whether identifiable or not, 
for the purpose of influencing or managing those whose data has been garnered”.
91
 This definition covers 
any collection and processing personal data through new policing processes, practices and software.
92
 
Nevertheless, Internet censorship is a controversial topic. On one hand, these techniques have the ability, for 
example, to limit available content, such as child pornography and hate speech. On the other hand, the same 
techniques can be used to suppress individuals and it is considered a significant threat to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.
93
 Unwarranted spying on states and citizens creates concerns about fundamental 
freedoms of online users and the extent to which state actors can/ should monitor citizens. These freedoms 
are not only linked to the right to privacy, freedom of speech and freedom of expression but also the data 
protections rights incorporated in international and regional treaties and conventions creates safeguards 
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against and over-intrusive and controlling state.
94
 Yet, tools to circumvent censorship have been developed 
and are being deployed by Internet users.
95
 Moreover, it has had a displacement effect on users, who are not 
cybercriminals, to use the Darknet and encryption tools. 
Some online areas are blocked by national legislation, and national and international ISPs are forced to 
introduce automatic filtering software. In the UK, there are four areas of information where filtering is in 
use, i.e. child abuse images, material which can infringe copyright, extremist material, and general illegal 
content. Yet, no system is 100% secure. On the one hand, this automatic filtering can cause over-blocking of 
data, where sites are blocked despite not falling directly into these four groups. For example, sexual health 
advice blogs, charity web pages, addiction support sites, political related sites and opinion blogs. On the 
other hand, the filtering systems are not without loopholes which allows for an under-blocking of data as the 




Social media companies, such as Facebook, Twitter, Google, MTV Networks/Viacom, etc. have developed 
their own monitoring software.
97
 Society today merges online and offline activities as well as public and 
private activities and therefore, it is impossible to separate the different actors’ involvement in policing the 
Internet. Both the public police and private security actors, ISPs and online companies have a role to play to 
enhance online safety.
98
 Social media companies have been criticised in relation to extremist content and 
propaganda uploaded by IS – especially after the second London attack in 2017, where UK Primer Minister 
Theresa May accused big online companies of not doing enough to prevent online extremist material to 
spread and for creating safe areas for terrorists.
99
 Moreover, social media companies, such as Twitter, 
Facebook and Google, have also been critiqued by British Members of Parliament for not taking tougher 
action to tackle hate speech online.
100
 As a response to criticism of the failure of social media companies to 
remove terrorism and extremist material online, Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Twitter joined forces in 




Yet, the criticism is not entirely fair. Social media companies have acted over the years and invested in better 
monitoring systems, but they are struggling to create a balance between security and censorship. Facebook 
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has received numerous complaints which have forced them to change their filtering systems and allowing 
content which normally would have been blocked, such as the iconic image of a girl fleeing a Napalm attack 
during the Vietnam war was removed because of nudity, and the same happened to cartoon breast cancer 
awareness video. In both cases, Facebook made a U-turn, apologised, and reinstalled the material.
102
 
Flagging up content is another technique developed by social media and online companies. This system 
allows users to express their concerns by reporting offensive content in the comment fields on news sites and 
blogs, yet, this has also been criticised as it can be misused.
103
  
Although only a limited number of Internet users are cybercriminals, all Internet users are being subjected to 
these software systems without having any choice to opt out, and there is always the chance that fully 
legitimate communication is subject to blocking or filtering because the software systems are applied 
indiscriminately.
104
 Additionally, the blocking and filtering systems are not reporting back the IP addresses 
of people who try to enter blocked sites, so the tools do not collect evidence which can be used to a formal 
investigation. Thus, private online monitoring techniques do not have the same effect as the tools deployed 
by law enforcement. In relation to the Darknet, these techniques are not useful as this space is beyond the 
control of states, ISPs, social media, and companies behind Internet search engines. 
5.1    Monitoring Data Traffic and Proactive Online Policing 
It is important to be able to police the Internet and identify cybercriminals while they are online on the basis 
of both online and offline intelligence. However, this can involve that the police officers may transgress the 
line of criminal activities which are committed by cybercriminals. This creates an ethical, moral and legal 
dilemma concerning how far law enforcement agents can go to detect, investigate and prosecute 
cybercriminals. In relation to the investigation of cybercrime, each investigative measure must be assessed in 
its own legal and practical context. This needs to be done to determine whether its interference with the 
privacy, family, home or correspondence of its subject can be justified. The nature of covert operations 
and/or electronic surveillance may raise privacy challenges. Almost all states have privacy safeguards 
incorporated in relation to investigating computer data and electronic communications. However, the way in 
which such protections are incorporated in law differs, and this can create obstacles to transnational covert 
operations in the online arena.
105
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In the United States, the gradual transition from reactive to proactive policing has resulted in a more 
expansive use of undercover operations mostly linked to the so-called buy-bust operations where the police 
create opportunities for someone to commit a crime, i.e. an undercover agent pose as someone who wants to 
buy drugs.
106
 Thus, undercover police become engaged in apparently illegal activity to gather evidence or to 
uphold their fabricated identities. For example, the FBI and Interpol have established trap sites, web pages or 
bulletin boards which either present genuine child pornography material – or allow contributors to supply 
images or information about authentic web pages or URLs.
107
 Yet, these activities are not considered to be 
crimes unless they are committed by ‘rough’ police officers not authorised to participate in the illegal 
activity. Instead, they are justified internally in law enforcement as a ‘necessary evil’ to carry out the 
operation. This practice of authorised criminality, developed by law enforcement, is conducted in secret, it is 
unaccountable, and it conflicts with the foundation of democratic policing based on the Rule of Law and its 
associated values, such as accountability and transparency. Circumventing democratic policing sends a 
mixed message to the public about moral standards which can undermine the social support for the police.
108
 
5.2    Balancing Proactive Policing and Criminal Activities.  
Proactive online policing cooperation is growing due to the transnational nature of virtual spaces. 
Undercover policing allows covert police officers to engage in activities that otherwise would be considered 
criminal.
109
. A number of these activities are seen in relation to online child abuse and economic cybercrime 
where it is impossible to investigate the illegal activities through the ordinary policing practices. Although 
the Darknet imposes significant challenges to policing different initiatives to crack the Tor router and 
Darknet code have been launched as well as policing operations which include a number of states. There are 
successful operations where law enforcement manages to break the Darknet codes or the encryption for 
several reasons.  
These operations can involve a lengthy operation where law enforcement is monitoring the Darknet and the 
offender makes a mistake as seen in relation to the ‘Silk Road’. The online ‘Silk Road’ was a busy black 
market for drugs which neither governmental legislation nor drug wars could control
110
. However, the 
                                                          
106
 Fijnaut and Marx 1995 (note 24 above), 15-16; Ross 2008 (note 24 above), 241; Kruisbergen et al 2011 (note 24 
above), 3. 
107
 Cohen-Almagor 2013 (note 21 above), 13; P Jenkins, Beyond Tolerance: Child Pornography on the Internet’ (New 
York University Press 2001), 159. 
108
 E E Joh, ‘Breaking the law to enforce it: Undercover police participation in crime’ (2009) 62 Stanford Law Review 
155, 157. 
109
 Jenkins 2001 (note 104 above), 157. 
110
 A Greenberg, ‘The Silk Road's dark-web dream is dead’ (Wired, 14 January 2016); Jardine 2015 (note 12 above). 
See also: J Martin, 'Lost on the Silk Road: online drug distribution and the 'cryptomarket'' (2014) 14(3) Criminology & 
Criminal Justice 351; J Martin 'Informal security nodes and force capital' (2012) 23(2) Policing & Society 145; J Martin 
and N Christin, 'Ethics in Dark Net Research' (2016) 35 International Journal of Drug Policy 84; J McCulloch and J 
Martin, 'Policing the Globe: International Trends and Issues in Policing', in B Arrigo and H Bersot (eds) International 
Book edition: Monica den Boer (Ed.) (2018) Edward Elgar Research Handbook on 
Comparative Policing from a Legal Perspective  2018
 
Darknet online market has been subjected to a number of disruptions of the illegal online trade starting with 
FBI taking down the ‘Silk Road’. Sites such as Evolution and its competitor Agora has gone offline due to 
the change of security following attacks on Tor's hidden services, as well as the FBI's mass takedown of 
Darknet markets in late 2014.
111
 So, it is possible to trace the sites and the people involved in the illegal 
online trade. However, it is very time consuming, and law enforcement has so far only managed to scratch 
the surface of the Darknet. According to Europol (2016), the use of encryption by criminals to protect their 
communications creates a significant challenge for law enforcement which creates obstacles to obtain access 
to essential intelligence and evidence.
112
  
Some of these activities have been successful and improvements have been introduced. The Danish Police 
managed to arrest drug traffickers after a surveillance investigation of the blockchain on the Darknet market 
places. The Blockchain technology makes it possible to trace the bitcoin translations on the Darknet and the 
evidence obtained using this technology was used in court. Moreover, the experience has been shared with 
states which participate in Europol, (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).
113
  Companies, such as 
Elliptic and Chainalysis, area also working with law enforcement agencies like the FBI, Interpol, Europol 
and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Know Your Customer (KYC) platform providers to investigate the 
Darknet.
114
 In 2017, months of covert monitoring, preparation and coordination have resulted, in the 
takedown of two of the largest criminal Dark Web markets, AlphaBay and Hansa in a joint cooperation led 
by FBI, the DEA and the Dutch National Police, with the support of Europol.
115
 Yet, these are only minor 
operations when set off against the wide range of illegal activities carried out on the Darknet. Naturally, 
these operations can successfully remove some actors and platforms, but the fact is that new and less 




5.3    Undercover Operations  
Working with police forces around the world, the FBI and their special agents fronted an investigation that 
ended in 2008 with 59 arrests and prevented an estimated US$70 million in bank fraud.
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 During the two-
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year longer operation, the FBI agent (Master Splyter) was undercover and became an active member of 
DarkMarket as well as the site’s administrator. The Spamhouse Project helped the FBI by creating a false 
identity for the FBI agents as a successful spammer prevented him from committing criminal.
118
 Putting 
‘Master Splyter’ on the list of the worst cyber-offenders created an opportunity for the police to investigate 
and prosecute members of the forum.
119
  
In 2010, the FBI created a fake carding forum called ‘Carder Profit’ allowing the FBI to collect information 
on cybercriminals. During this two-year long operation, the FBI recorded the IP addresses of users’ 
computers who accessed the site which resulted in a number of arrests in different states.
120
 The problem is to 
what extent the FBI was involved in criminal activities by allowing cards and card details to be sold on the 
fake web page while they were monitoring the criminal activities. As mentioned above, one of the most 
fundamental policing principles is that the police officers should never incite the commission of a crime. If 
this principle is not respected by the law enforcement or their informant, the court can claim that the 
investigators have acted as agent provocateurs and the evidence would not be permissible (Harfield, infra).
121
 
It can be questioned whether the FBI overstepped that line when they created this criminal forum. It is also 
questionable whether other states can build a case on the FBI evidence unless they have been involved in the 
operation and acted within the limit of the national law. Otherwise, they need to carry out their own 
investigation by seizing the computer devices and trace the offender’s actions.  
Other successful operations have been carried out on the Darknet in the aftermath of the success with the 
‘Silk Road’. For example, “Operation Hyperion” was started by U.S. Federal Law Enforcement, the Five 
Eyes Law Enforcement Group (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States) 
together with Europol. This operation is considered to be a step towards developing a more unified global 
law enforcement response to the growing usage of the Darknet by cybercriminals. The main target is to focus 
on individuals seeking to buy and sell illicit drugs and other illegal goods and services.
122
 However, 
information is published about the actual operation and whether it has been based on a lengthy undercover 
operation as outlined above. The lack of information is to some extent understandable as it can jeopardize 
other operations. However, the strategic powers available for police forces should be made public to ensure 
transparency and accountability – and the public can debate whether they believe that these measures are 
acceptable. 
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6    Conclusion  
The most considerable challenge to online police derives from a lack of consensus worldwide in how to 
manage cybercrime and exchange knowledge across border. At present, there are too many safe places for 
cybercriminals to hide and carry out their illegal activities from a distance. The lack of international and 
national harmonised legislative frameworks can over time lead to mission creep in areas where 
accountability and transparency are insufficiently guaranteed. The normalisation of exceptional policing 
norms can create grey zones where these norms are adopted without any legislative foundation. Moreover, 
the limits of and between public and private policing need to be defined. Without any doubt, private policing 
has a role to play in a pluralistic policing system of virtual spaces and a number of private actors can help 
law enforcement to develop software, technical security measures, monitor content uploaded and report 
offensive behaviours.  
There is a pressing need for developing a new global cybercrime Convention which update and harmonise 
the criminalisation of online offences to reflect the current threat. States worldwide need to find a common 
stance and develop a universal treaty, which is long overdue to manage the growing types of cyber threats 
and different virtual platforms, such as the Darknet and impenetrable encryption tools which create obstacles 
for the policing of different communication tools used by cybercriminals. Moreover, a new Convention 
needs to set out global legal standards to prevent the creation of safe havens for cybercriminals. This chapter 
has demonstrated that there is an imbalanced approach to the criminalisation and the management of online 
offences. The way cybercrime is being policed at present is fragmented and does not keep in pace with 
developments. Hence, the policing effort fails to proportionately reflect the pervasiveness of the threat and 
the huge number of victims who suffer from a wide range of Internet crimes.  
Meanwhile, problems are exacerbating with the use of the Darknet and encryption tools, making it very 
difficult to investigate and prosecute online offenders. In this context, it is important to recognise the role of 
private policing actors (see Shearing and Stenning infra) and the work that ISPs and online businesses are 
doing to manage the data flow – yet, they can improve their work; and initiatives has been taken to create 
better-monitoring systems. Moreover, it is important that relevant actors improve their mutual 
communication, and pool their capabilities and resources in joint operations to manage the growing misuse 
of cyberspace. In this context, it is important that private actors are consulted and involved in creating a new 
Convention as they have a significant role to play in policing the Internet.  
The Darknet constitutes a challenge for police officers as means and methods developed to police the 
Internet are unusable due to the architecture of the Internet. Active covert police operations focused on the 
dismantling of criminal networks and catching offenders are becoming more widespread. Nevertheless, these 
activities are a balancing act. On the one hand, it is important to be able to police the Internet and the 
Darknet. On the other hand, on-line policing the transgression of formal lines for the collection of evidence. 
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This creates an ethical, moral and legal dilemma concerning how far law enforcement agents can go to 
detect, investigate and prosecute cybercriminals and cyberterrorists.  
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